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Abstract. The B method is a formal specification method and a means
of formal verification and validation of safety-critical systems such as
railway systems. In this short paper, we use the B4MSecure tool to trans-
form the UML models, fulfilling requirements of European Railway Traf-
fic Management System (ERTMS) operating rules, into B specifications
in order to formally validate them.
Keywords: Railway operating rules, UML models, Role Based Access
Control, B method, formal validation.
1 Introduction
ERTMS [6] is the European Railway Traﬃc Management System which is de-
signed to replace the national on-board railway systems in Europe in order to
make rail transport safer and more competitive, and to improve cross-border con-
nections. ERTMS includes the European Train Control System (ETCS) which
speciﬁes the on-board equipment and its communication with the trackside.
The aim of our work is to confront the European speciﬁcations with the na-
tional operating rules, as well as the use of formal models to validate whether
a given scenario fulﬁlls the speciﬁcation regarding the functional and safety re-
quirements. We propose to model a nominal scenario of Movement Authority
(MA), extracted from ERTMS operating rules, and to translate it into B speci-
ﬁcations in order to validate it.
In the following section, an overview of the nominal scenario MA is given and
its UML models are described. Section 3 highlights the B formal validation after
an automatic translation of these models into B speciﬁcations using B4MSecure.
Finally, section 4 concludes this paper.
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2 Movement Authority Overview
Movement Authority (MA) is an authorization given to a train to move to a given
point as a supervised movement. Some features can be used to deﬁne an MA,
such as sections subdividing it, the time-out value attached to each section, etc.
The MA function unfolds with interactions between the OnboardSafetyManage-
ment (the on-board computer-based machine), the TracksideSafetyManagement
(the trackside computer-based machine), and the Driver, as follows:
MA.1 The OnboardSafetyManagement requests anMA to the TracksideSystem.
MA.2 The TracksideSafetyManagement receives the MA request from the
TracksideSystem.
MA.3 The TracksideSafetyManagement proposes an MA to the TracksideSys-
tem after creating it. It can also modify and/or delete the MA.
MA.4 The OnboardSafetyManagement receives the proposed MA from the
TracksideSystem, authorizes it and processes the MA authorization in or-
der to be displayed in the Driver Machine Interface (DMI).
MA.5 The Driver reads the authorized MA.
Each step of this scenario represents a permission to do an action on an entity
by a role. On this basis, 3 roles (OnboardSafetyManagement, TracksideSafety-
Management, Driver), 3 system entities (TracksideSystem, MA, DMI ) and 10
possible permissions (underlined actions) can be extracted.
Our approach consists in, on the one hand, the modeling of ERTMS operat-
ing rules in semi-formal UML notations with their graphical views and dedicated
proﬁles extensions taking into account various aspects (structural, dynamic, be-
havioural, etc.), and on the other hand, their validation and veriﬁcation with
a formal B method with its mathematical notations and automated proof. The
combination of these two notations has been studied and several approaches of
UML to B translation have been proposed, cited in [3]. In order to model the
scenario above, we use B4MSecure platform supporting the UML/B modeling
process and lying within the scope of Model Driven Engineering (MDE).
For the sake of concision, the B4MSecure platform [7] is brieﬂy presented.
As an Eclipse platform, it is dedicated to formally validate a functional UML
model enhanced by an access control policy. It uses a Role Based Acces Con-
trol (RBAC) proﬁle inspired from SecureUML proﬁle [4]. This proﬁle aims at
specifying information related to access control in order to model roles and their
permisssions. This platform acts in 3 steps: a functional UML class diagram
specifying system entities, security UML models with an access control policy
and the translation of both models into B speciﬁcations.
Following the three-stepped approach of B4MSecure, a functional UML class
diagram containing all system entities as classes and the relationships between
them is built. Then, security UML class diagrams enhance the functional model
by expressing which role has the permission to perform a given action in the
railway system: a class diagram dedicated to the roles and others dedicated to
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the access control policies which are based on permissions linking the roles to
the entities, such as the access control of the MA in Fig. 1. A permission is
modeled as a UML association class, between a role and a class of the functional
model, with a stereotype Permission. For instance, MA.4 is modeled in Fig. 1
by the permission of the OnboardSafetyManagement to authorize the MA. All
these diagrams are translated to B speciﬁcations.
Fig. 1. Roles and permissions associated with MA
3 B Formal Validation of Movement Authority
The functional model is translated into a unique B machine, named Functional,
and permissions are translated into a B machine, named RBAC Model. As shown
in Fig. 2, the functional formal model follows a classical translation scheme sim-
ilar to [5]. The RBAC Model adds variables about permissions and roles. For
example, PermissionAssignement is a total function from PERMISSIONS to
the cartesian product (ROLES * ENTITIES), and isPermitted is a relation be-
tween ROLES and Operations sets. PERMISSIONS, ENTITIES and Operations
are the sets deﬁned in RBAC Model, while ROLES is a set deﬁned in the in-
cluded UserAssignments machine. Initialization of these variables is conformant
to the SecureUML model. Then, initialization proof obligation, produced by the
AtelierB prover for these variables, allows to verify whether the SecureUML
model respects RBAC well-formedness rules such as no cycles in role hierarchy,
etc. The operations of the security formal model encapsulate the operational
part of the functional formal model. Each functional operation is associated
with an operation in the security model verifying that a user has permission to
call the functional operation. For instance, secure MA authorizeMA operation
of RBAC Model checks the permissions associated with the functional operation
MA authorizeMA. Secured operations add a statement in the postcondition
B Formal Validation of ERTMS/ETCS Railway Operating Rules 127
Machine
Functional
SETS
MA_AS; ...
ABSTRACT_VARIABLES
MA, ...
INVARIANT
MA <: MA_AS & ...
INITIALISATION
MA := {} || ...
OPERATIONS
MA__authorizeMA(Instance)=
PRE
Instance : MA &
MA__AuthorizedMA(Instance) = FALSE
THEN
MA__AuthorizedMA(Instance) := TRUE
END; ...
END
Machine
RBAC_Model
INCLUDES
Functional, UserAssignments
SEES
ContextMachine
SETS
ENTITIES = {MA_Label, ...};
Attributes = {MA_AuthorizedMA_Label, ...};
Operations ={MA_authorizeMA_Label, ...} ...
VARIABLES
PermissionAssignement, isPermitted, ...
INVARIANT
PermissionAssignement: PERMISSIONS --> (ROLES * ENTITIES)
& isPermitted: ROLES <-> Operations ...
INITIAISATION
PermissionAssignement :=
{(OSM_MAPerm|->(OnboardSafetyManagement|->MA_Label)),...}
OPERATIONS
secure_MA__authorizeMA(Instance)= PRE
Instance: MA & MA__AuthorizedMA(Instance) = FALSE THEN
SELECT MA__authorizeMA_Label : isPermitted[currentRole]
THEN MA__authorizeMA(Instance)
END
END; ...
END
Fig. 2. Functional and RBAC Model machines
e.g SELECT MA authorizeMA Label: isPermitted[currentRole] in order to ver-
ify whether MA authorizeMA Label is allowed to the connected user using a
particular role. Indeed, isPermitted computes, from the initial state, the set of
authorized functional operations for each role.
UML models of extracted ERTMS/ETCS operating rules containing 7 func-
tional classes, 5 roles and 17 permissions are transformed into 830 lines of func-
tional formal model and 1545 lines of security formal model. We use the ProB
animator in order to validate these speciﬁcations. A ﬁrst animation checks the
nominal behaviour ofMovement Authority. Then variants of this animation check
that the given permissions forbid the execution of secure actions by unautho-
rized roles, since a secure action can be performed only with a permission given
to a role. The ability of the system speciﬁed by the class diagram to play the
ERTMS scenarios is checked through animations of the corresponding trans-
formed B model. These animations validate the permissions assigned to each
role. But they don’t check that the sequence of actions models the MA protocol.
Actually, the sequence of actions is deﬁned in the animation by the user, but
it is not embedded in the UML/B model. This can be resolved by adding some
contraints as preconditions in secured operations. Nevertheless, adding these
conditions breaks the consistency between the UML model and the B machine.
Owing to the lack of dynamic aspects in UML class diagrams, we intend to ex-
plore more UML diagrams as future work. Then we will focus on enriching UML
class diagrams with, for instance, sequence diagrams which model the ordered
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interactions in scenarios and deriving B speciﬁcations from them in order to
validate system’s behavior.
At this stage, safety requirements have not yet been integrated to B speciﬁca-
tions. As further work, we will consider enriching the B speciﬁcations with safety
properties stemming from safety requirements of the ERTMS operating rules in
order to formally verify them using the B prover. Moreover, SysML requirement
diagrams combined with our UML diagrams may guarantee the traceability as-
pects of system requirements when they will be translated to B speciﬁcations.
4 Conclusion
In this short paper, we have presented a Movement Authority function extracted
from the ERTMS/ETCS operating rules. This function was modeled using UML
graphical notations and then translated automatically, via the B4MSecure plat-
form, into B speciﬁcations which were checked successfully using the ProB ani-
mator. The combination of UML/B aims to ease the understanding of the system
with the graphical notations of UML and formally validate system requirements
with B formal notations. Research works done in the Selkis project [1], [2] and [3]
show the eﬃciency of this platform and its diﬀerent steps leading to the formal
validation of scenarios in the healthcare Information Systems by seeking for ma-
licious sequences of operations. However, in this paper, we show the use of this
existant platform in another context related to distributed railway systems and
their operating rules.
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